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Abstract 
For about 20 years, a rather wide range of conceptual approaches to the social 
study of science and technology have emerged which have occasionally been la-
belled “postconstructivist”. Although these conceptions differ in various respects, 
they have in common a twofold opposition: against traditional representationalist 
realism as well as “classical” social constructivism established by the “sociology of 
scientific knowledge” (SSK). In order to escape the pitfalls of both these views (and 
to overcome the familiar, yet unfruitful opposition between them), postconstructiv-
ist perspectives understand and study the sciences primarily in term of their situ-
ated material and discursive practices. The present article starts with a brief retro-
spect on why and how since the mid-1980s postconstructivist trends have ques-
tioned not only rationalist and realist accounts but also the conceptual foundations 
and background assumptions of SSK’s claim to explain sociologically the content of 
science. Subsequently, the central features of a postconstructivist perspective in 
science studies are outlined, referring to the key concepts of “knowledge”, “prac-
tice”, and “performativity”. The fruitfulness of a theoretical approach focusing on 
scientific practices is illustrated using the example of the increasingly important 
issue of scientific non-knowledge: In the same way that knowledge is not to be 
comprehended as simply the mental “possession” of a knower, non-knowledge is 
not merely the lack thereof but an (unrecognised) implication of materially and so-
cially situated research practices. Finally, it is emphasised that postconstructivist 
science studies should not be misunderstood as claiming (as do realism and con-
structivism) to provide a meta-theoretical explanation or legitimation of science. 
Instead, postconstructivism should be conceived as a situated critical effort to chal-
lenge one-sided accounts of scientific knowledge and foster more self-reflective re-
search practices. 
 
                                                             
1 I would like to thank two anonymous reviewers as well as the editors of the Special Issue for 
their helpful comments on an earlier draft of this article. 
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1 Introduction: Why Post-
constructivism? 
Introducing another “post”-term into 
social science debates (after postmod-
ernity, poststructuralism and so forth) 
will doubtlessly raise a lot of well-
founded objections. Nevertheless, in 
the present article I hope to success-
fully establish my thesis that the hith-
erto only sparsely used concept of 
“postconstructivism” is appropriate 
and important, if not indispensable, in 
order to denote a new and distinct re-
search perspective that has emerged in 
science and technology studies over the 
last two decades. Although, in some 
cases, the “boundaries” might not ap-
pear to be clear-cut, this perspective on 
a conceptual level differs significantly 
from the “classical” social constructiv-
ist sociology of scientific knowledge, 
but no less, for instance, from the so-
called “operative constructivism” of 
Niklas Luhmann’s theory of social sys-
tems. In addition, postconstructivism 
might turn out to be a more promising 
approach to the empirical study of im-
portant issues in the area of science 
studies than social constructivism.    
In order to substantiate these claims, I 
would first like to briefly review how 
and why it is that postconstructivist 
views have been emerging within sci-
ence and technology studies for around 
20 years or so. Second, I shall explain 
in greater detail the general outlines 
and central features of a postconstruc-
tivist perspective in science studies, fo-
cusing primarily on the work of the 
feminist theorist and physicist Karen 
Barad, the sociologist of science An-
drew Pickering and the philosopher 
Joseph Rouse, all of them as yet not 
very broadly perceived within the 
German-speaking debate.2 Thirdly, us-
                                                             
2 For pragmatic reasons, I concentrate in 
this article primarily on science studies. 
Nina Degele has recently reclaimed the im-
portance of a postconstructivist view for 
technology studies as well, in order to bring 
the “materiality of things” (back) to the fore 
(Degele 2002: 127). Yet, by speaking of “re-
ing the example of scientific ignorance 
or non-knowledge with special atten-
tion to what I have elsewhere termed 
“unrecognised non-knowledge” (Weh-
ling 2004), I would like to illustrate 
that a postconstructivist perspective is 
able to provide new and fruitful ap-
proaches to both scientifically and po-
litically relevant issues. Finally, I 
would like to explain briefly how the 
postconstructivist claim to move be-
yond the well-established opposition of 
realism and constructivism should be 
interpreted and justified. As a result, it 
might become clear that the somewhat 
artificial and perhaps only provisional 
term “postconstructivism” demarcates 
important differences to both (social) 
constructivism and (representative) 
realism and contributes to clarifying 
and developing the conceptual founda-
tions of science studies. 
2 The Emergence of Postcon-
structivist Perspectives in 
Science Studies 
Why did postconstructivist interpreta-
tions emerge in the mid-1980s in im-
plicit or explicit opposition to the con-
structivist “sociology of scientific 
knowledge” (SSK) that itself had be-
come established as a new and quick-
to-dominate paradigm in science stud-
ies only ten years before? In his book 
Scientific practice and ordinary ac-
tion, published in 1993, Michael 
Lynch, from his ethnomethodological 
point of view, stated a crisis of the con-
structivist and relativist sociologies of 
science and assumed that one could 
                                                                          
alist postconstructivism” with regard to 
Bruno Latour’s and Michel Callon’s actor-
network theory (ANT) (ibid: 126) she in-
vites two possible misunderstandings: ei-
ther it is suggested that postconstructivism 
ultimately is a renewed and extended form 
of realism or that there might also be a 
“constructivist postconstructivism” as op-
posed to a realist variant. By contrast, what 
I shall attempt to show is that postcon-
structivism aims to question and transgress 
the entrenched dichotomy of realism and 
constructivism (cf. Barad 1996; Rouse 
2002b; Asdal 2005). 
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observe, as a consequence, the emer-
gence of “postconstructivist trends” 
(Lynch 1993: 107-113).3 These various 
trends amounted to questioning the 
key terms of “the strong program’s 
agenda to give sociological explana-
tions of the content of science” (ibid.: 
112): how can, for instance, “social” 
factors be discriminated from “cogni-
tive” or “natural” ones, and what 
should be considered the “content of 
science”? According to Lynch, “the 
most radical and interesting of the 
postconstructivist sociologies of scien-
tific knowledge” (ibid.: 111) at that time 
appeared to be the actor-network-
theory (ANT) which, some years be-
fore, based on the work of Bruno La-
tour, Michel Callon and others, had 
developed into a novel and independ-
ent approach in the area of science and 
technology studies. With regard to the 
conceptual foundations of science 
studies, Latour (1992) had argued for 
“one more turn after the social turn” 
and criticised the “complete asymme-
try” in David Bloor’s famous symmetry 
principle: “Society was supposed to ex-
plain nature.” (Latour 1992: 278) In 
their exchange with Callon and Latour, 
Collins and Yearley quite straightfor-
wardly expressed this explanatory 
strategy by giving the following meth-
odological advice to their adversaries: 
“We provide a prescription: stand on 
social things – be social realists – in 
order to explain natural things.” 
(Collins/Yearley 1992b: 382). As Rouse 
convincingly argues, this “prescription” 
                                                             
3 A few years later, in his outline of “a con-
structivist genealogy of social constructiv-
ism”, Lynch (1998: 18) referred to those 
conceptual developments in terms of a 
“post history” of social constructivism in 
the course of which “hybrid constructiv-
isms” proliferated and a loose consensus 
emerged that practice “is the heart” of the 
social study of science. Remarkably, Lynch 
(1993: 91) did not integrate the studies of 
laboratory research inspired by eth-
nomethodology (e.g. Lynch 1985) into the 
“constructivist line”. In fact, those studies 
show at least as many conceptual intersec-
tions with “postconstructivist” accounts of 
science and technology as with classical so-
cial constructivism.. 
results in both “the reification of natu-
ral scientific knowledge as a determi-
nate explanandum and the reification 
of some aspect of the social world as a 
potential explanans” (Rouse 2002a: 
136). It was the implicit asymmetry in 
SSK as well as this twofold reification 
that ANT sought to overcome by its 
“extended symmetry principle” which 
ascribed the same explanatory power 
to non-human “actants” as to humans 
and refused to make any a priori dis-
tinction between them. 
Presumably, ANT is – particularly 
within the German-speaking scholarly 
discussion – still the best-known and 
most prominent conceptual effort to 
get beyond certain shortcomings of 
SSK’s social constructivism (cf. Krohn 
2000; Degele 2002). It nevertheless 
remains highly contested, not least 
with respect to the proclaimed “sym-
metry” between human and non-
human actants.4 However, within the 
field that might be characterised as 
“postconstructivist”, there is, besides 
ANT, a wider range of different, yet no 
less important and perhaps even more 
sophisticated, approaches to the social 
study of science that have emerged 
during the last 15 years.5 Some of 
those, as for instance Pickering’s 
“pragmatic realism” or Karen Barad’s 
“agential realism”, label themselves 
“realist” in order to make still more 
explicit the conceptual difference from 
(social) constructivism. Against this 
background, the philosopher of science 
                                                             
4 For rather different objections see, for in-
stance, Collins/Yearley 1992 a, b; Pickering 
1995: 13-15; Weingart 2003: 76-77. 
5 The same applies for technology studies: 
apart from ANT, one could mention here, 
for instance, the so-called “workplace stud-
ies” which have emerged in recent years; 
these draw on ethnography, ethnomethod-
ology, and conversation analysis and show 
a lot of overlaps with postconstructivist ac-
counts of scientific practices. In workplace 
studies, technical work is conceived as both 
socially and materially “situated practice in 
which the context is part of the activity” 
(Orr 1996: 10). A survey of this field has 
been given by Knoblauch and Heath 
(1999). 
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Joseph Rouse in a recent review essay 
has re-adopted the term “postconstruc-
tivism” (without making any recognis-
able reference to Lynch) and stated 
that particularly “the work of cultural 
historians, anthropologists, and femi-
nist theories of science has taken post-
constructivist science studies in impor-
tant new directions” (Rouse 2002b: 
62). In his essay, nicely titled “Vam-
pires: Social Constructivism, Realism, 
and Other Philosophical Undead”, 
Rouse mentions as proponents and 
promoters of postconstructivism, 
among other scholars, Donna Hara-
way, Evelyn Fox Keller, Peter Galison 
and Hans-Jörg Rheinberger and con-
siders the book Science as Practice and 
Culture, edited by Pickering (1992a), a 
“benchmark for sociologists’ shift away 
from social constructivism and its un-
derlying humanism” (ibid). 
What precisely is at issue in the post-
constructivist criticism and shift away 
from SSK’s social constructivism? De-
spite the well-known multiplicity and 
heterogeneity of constructivist ap-
proaches within science studies, an-
swering this question requires at least 
a preliminary, minimal definition of 
social constructivism to be offered. I 
borrow such a definition from Rouse’s 
book Engaging Science, in which he 
characterises social constructivist sci-
ence studies by the following two fea-
tures: “First, all scientific beliefs must 
be accounted for by social factors, 
whatever that analytical category turns 
out to include; second, any adequate 
interpretation of scientific knowledge 
claims must be neutral with respect to 
their epistemic or political legitimacy 
and hence to that extent is committed 
to some form of epistemic relativism.” 
(Rouse 1996a: 9 – original emphasis) 
Given this background, the objections 
raised by Latour, Pickering and others 
were directed against a tendency to-
wards a sociological reductionism in 
science studies, accompanied by what 
Collins and Yearley had termed “social 
realism” which inclines to reify certain 
aspects of social life (interests, power 
relations, cultural identities and so 
forth) into a stable, self-evident and 
uncontestable reality. It was argued by 
SSK’s critics that the exclusive focus on 
(supposedly) “social factors” tends to 
marginalise or even (almost) com-
pletely negate the importance for the 
establishment of scientific knowledge 
of non-social, material factors and ob-
jects. A striking example of this ten-
dency can be seen in Collins’ pro-
grammatic statement “that the natural 
world must be treated as though it did 
not affect our perception of it” (Collins 
1983: 88). Consequently, Collins 
pleads (1981: 3) for an “explicit relativ-
ism in which the natural world has a 
small or non-existent role in the con-
struction of scientific knowledge”.6 
While the “postconstructivist trends” 
were highly critical of such claims, they 
nevertheless refused to return to any 
form of “traditional” representative re-
alism. Instead, the objective was to ar-
ticulate a more adequate alternative to 
representative realism “while avoiding 
antirealism”, as Pickering (1989: 279) 
has put it. The various postconstructiv-
ist approaches thus started to tenta-
tively develop theoretical conceptions 
which, explicitly or implicitly, aimed to 
overcome the realism-constructivism-
divide. I would like to illustrate this 
move referring to Pickering’s afore-
mentioned paper “Living in the mate-
rial world”, published in 1989, in 
which he describes his own view, 
maybe for the first time ever, as 
“pragmatic realism” in order to demar-
cate it from both social constructivism 
and representative realism. According 
to Pickering, on the one hand, “it is 
clear that material practice – interac-
tion with the material world – can play 
a constitutive role in knowledge pro-
duction” (ibid.: 280). Yet, on the other 
                                                             
6 It is no coincidence that Niklas Luhmann 
(1990: 37) affirmatively quotes this state-
ment. In spite of all other differences, the 
denial of a significant role of the “natural 
world” indicates and constitutes a remark-
able affinity between Luhmann’s “operative 
constructivism” and Collins’ “Empirical 
Programme of Relativism”. 
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hand, the resulting connection “be-
tween knowledge and the material 
world has (…) to be understood not in 
terms of fixed correspondence but 
rather in terms of local, potentially un-
stable coherences achieved between 
material procedures and conceptual 
models” (ibid.: 281). What should 
therefore move to the fore of science 
studies is “the making of coherence” 
(ibid.: 279 – emphasis added) in an 
open and contingent process of mutual 
“interactive stabilization” of cognitive 
expectations and the effects of experi-
mental practices. In this manner, 
Pickering (and others) argued, the ob-
jectivity of scientific knowledge and its 
constitutive relation to material phe-
nomena could be re-integrated into the 
social study of science without falling 
back into representational realism ac-
cording to which nature has always ex-
isted “out there” exactly like it is de-
picted by the sciences. Thus, with re-
gard to realism, the decisive shift leads 
from “representation” or “correspon-
dence” as an abstract philosophical 
idea (in the sense of an adequation be-
tween things and concepts, between 
reality and theory) to the sociological 
study of various representational prac-
tices in science (Lynch/Woolgar 1990), 
or from “representation of” to “repre-
sentation as” (Rheinberger 1997: 103).  
Yet, to consistently sketch out a post-
constructivist perspective requires not 
only conceptual transformations in the 
traditional realist philosophy of science 
but major revisions of the constructiv-
ist sociology of science as well. There 
can be little doubt that these revisions 
will have to go even beyond the two 
above-mentioned objections to socio-
logical reductionism and epistemologi-
cal relativism. For, if one widens the 
critical stance on social constructivism, 
one will become aware that the sociol-
ogy of scientific knowledge – despite 
all its criticisms of rationalistic phi-
losophies of science – inadvertently 
shared the premises and hidden as-
sumptions of the latter (in particular a 
cognitivist focus and fixation on scien-
tific theories) to a much greater extent 
than is usually acknowledged. Before I 
refer to this point in greater detail in 
the next section, I would like to briefly 
draw two rather preliminary conclu-
sions from this brief historical retro-
spect. 
First, it has become clear that postcon-
structivism should not be understood 
in a merely temporal sense, as some-
thing which simply comes “after” con-
structivism. Instead, it primarily in-
cludes a conceptual dimension which 
presupposes and builds upon construc-
tivist science studies and their objec-
tions to ahistorical realist and rational-
ist explanations of scientific knowl-
edge. Accordingly, postconstructivism 
means and implies a self-reflection of 
(social) constructivism, not a return to 
any kind of “pre-constructivist” realism 
and objectivism. At most, one could 
speak of a “re-entry” of realism into 
constructivism, as does Wolfgang 
Krohn (2000), using the vocabulary of 
Luhmann’s systems theory, with re-
gard to Latour’s work. One should, 
however, not fail to see that such a re-
entry does not leave unchanged the 
two seemingly contradictory and in-
compatible views. For postconstructiv-
ism ultimately aims to overcome the 
rigid and highly polarised opposition 
of the “philosophical undead” (Rouse) 
realism and constructivism by ques-
tioning the supposedly self-evident 
premises and hidden assumptions on 
which this opposition is founded. 
Secondly, within the area of science 
studies there is no single established 
and consistent postconstructivist the-
ory or approach but a rather wide 
range of theoretical perspectives and 
research programmes which might be 
labelled “postconstructivist”, though 
these themselves use quite different 
terms for their self-description. Be-
sides Latour’s and Callon’s ANT, these 
perspectives include, for instance, 
Pickering’s “pragmatic realism” 
(Pickering 1995), Rheinberger’s “epis-
temology of experimentation” 
(Rheinberger 1997), Rouse’s philoso-
phical “naturalism” (Rouse 2002a), or 
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Barad’s “agential realism” (Barad 
1996) and other feminist accounts of 
science. Nevertheless, in spite of all the 
differences between theoretical back-
grounds, disciplinary contexts, and so 
on, these perspectives have one crucial 
and fundamental feature in common 
which, in a more general sense, allows 
postconstructivism to be spoken of in 
terms of an emerging new perspective 
in science studies: science is conceived 
and analysed primarily in terms of 
practices, especially of material and 
performative practices. An important 
impulse for this shift “from science as 
knowledge to science as practice” 
(Pickering 1992b) has doubtless been 
given by the re-discovery and revalori-
sation of the experiment and its sig-
nificant role in the production of scien-
tific knowledge during the 1980s in 
philosophy, history and sociology of 
science (see for instance Hacking 1983; 
Gooding et al. 1989). 
In the following section I would like to 
illustrate some of the theoretical impli-
cations and consequences of those de-
velopments in greater detail by sketch-
ing out the central features of postcon-
structivism (or, rather, the various 
postconstructivist perspectives men-
tioned above). As I indicated at the 
outset, I shall refer mainly to the work 
of Barad, Pickering and Rouse. Rouse’s 
sometimes rather pointed reflections 
and statements are particularly well-
suited to making explicit the character-
istics of postconstructivism and its 
theoretical differences from social con-
structivist sociologies of scientific 
knowledge. 
3 Outlines of a Postconstruc-
tivist Perspective in Science 
Studies 
It has become clear that – beyond 
“bringing back in” material factors and 
their importance for the production of 
scientific knowledge – postconstructiv-
ism implies a critical, self-reflective 
evaluation and revision of the premises 
and background assumptions on which 
SSK, more implicitly than explicitly, is 
based. I would like to illustrate the 
characteristics and the reach of such a 
self-reflective turn with regard to the 
following three key concepts and is-
sues: knowledge, practice, and per-
formativity. 
3.1 A “Deflationary” and “Non-
Reifying” Conception of 
Knowledge 
What “is” knowledge, and in particular 
scientific knowledge, and how can it be 
conceived of in a theoretically appro-
priate and productive manner? Usu-
ally, it is understood as something that 
is “possessed” and “applied” by a 
knower and transmitted by communi-
cative interaction (cf. Rouse 1996b: 
406). Contrary to these common-sense 
notions Rouse has developed a “dy-
namic” and “deflationary” account of 
knowledge, drawing on deflationary 
conceptions of truth: “In both cases, 
truth and knowledge, the deflationary 
move is a shift from thinking about a 
putative object that a concept could 
describe to thinking about the prac-
tices in which the concept is used.” 
(Rouse 1996a: 199) According to this 
“practice turn” (Schatzki et al. 2001), 
knowledge is not to be understood 
(and “reified”) as an independent and 
coherent entity or object which is dis-
covered by science and thus explains 
and justifies scientific practices. As 
Rouse has put it: “There are many ap-
propriate ascriptions of ‚knowing’ 
within the multifarious practices of as-
sessing, attributing, relying upon, or 
contesting understanding and justifica-
tion, but there is no nature of knowl-
edge underlying these ascriptions.” 
(Rouse 2002a: 179 – original empha-
sis).7 Instead, (scientific) knowledge 
“consists” of nothing but those prac-
                                                             
7 In deflationary theories, the same applies 
for truth: in this case “the truth predicate 
and the capacity to use it are recognized as 
indispensable to linguistic and epistemic 
practices, even though no underlying na-
ture of truth unifies or reifies the instances 
of its appropriate application” (Rouse 
2002a: 179). 
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tices of generating, attributing, and 
justifying knowledge, and “the histori-
cally situated and contested develop-
ment of the practices themselves suf-
fices us to understand them” (Rouse 
1996a: 200). 
From this non-essentialist account of 
scientific knowledge three far-reaching 
conclusions can be drawn: 
1) First, knowledge is an effect and an 
implication of situated practices and 
can only partly and “artificially” be 
separated and isolated from them: 
“Knowledge is embedded in our re-
search practices rather than being fully 
abstractable in representational theo-
ries.” (Rouse 1987: 24). This insight 
not only implies that scientific knowl-
edge is far more intransparent, am-
biguous and “intrinsically open to mul-
tiple interpretations” than rationalistic 
philosophies of science usually admit 
(Rouse 1996a: 25-26). In addition, sci-
entific knowledge frequently or even 
regularly encompasses what Collins 
(2001: 72), in an illuminating attempt 
to discriminate different forms of tacit 
knowledge, has termed “unrecognized 
knowledge” and “uncog-
nized/uncognizable knowledge”. With 
these categories, he refers to cases 
when scientists are able to successfully 
conduct an experiment without being 
fully and explicitly aware of why and 
how it works. One should therefore al-
ways take into account the possibility 
of unexpected, unrecognised or only 
partly recognised effects and implica-
tions of research or the technological 
implementation of its results. I shall 
refer to this point more broadly below.  
2) Given this background, it would be 
severely misleading to conceive of 
knowledge primarily or even exclu-
sively as a “possession” or “property” 
of individuals or social groups such as 
certain scientific communities. In-
stead, the attribution of knowledge is 
“more like a characterization of the 
situation knowers find themselves 
within rather than a description of 
something they acquire, possess, per-
form, or exchange” (Rouse 1996a: 133). 
As Rouse emphasises, this does not 
mean simply rejecting our ordinary 
ways of speaking and thinking about 
knowing. “It can be perfectly appropri-
ate to ascribe knowledge to a knower, 
so long as we understand that correct 
ascription of knowledge depends on 
how the knower is situated within on-
going practices rather than simply on 
whether the knower ‘possesses’ the 
right beliefs or skills (…).” (Ibid.) For 
better understanding, one should be 
aware that Rouse’s concept of prac-
tices, following Donald Davidson, in-
cludes linguistic or discursive practices 
as well (cf. Rouse 1996a: 205-236; see 
also Section 2.2). “Knowing” certain 
theories or “understanding” certain 
scientific concepts thus implies and 
means competently participating in 
discursive practices of connecting 
those theories and concepts to other 
theoretical models and/or phenomena 
and situations in the world. To illus-
trate this point, Rouse uses the follow-
ing example: “Biologists (...) employ a 
rich terminology to articulate struc-
tural features of living cells: nuclei, ri-
bosomes, mitochondria, membranes, 
Golgi bodies, and so forth. The applica-
tion of these terms was regularised and 
is now learned through the use of mul-
tiple ‚models’. Schematic diagrams de-
pict these components in structural re-
lationships. These diagrams are con-
nected to cells through various labora-
tory manipulations (...). With these 
models available, it is perfectly 
straightforward to learn to understand 
(and to utter understandably) sen-
tences employing terms like ‚mito-
chondria’, whose truth conditions en-
compass events taking place in unex-
amined cells outside the laboratory set-
ting.” (Rouse 1996a: 229). 
3) The deflationary, non-reifying ac-
count of knowledge results in a signifi-
cantly modified and extended concep-
tion of what should be comprehended 
as the “content” of science. This point 
is crucial in order to fully realise the 
“postconstructivist” objections to social 
constructivism. As is well-known, the 
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so-called strong programme outlined 
by David Bloor in 1976 aimed to ex-
plain sociologically “the very content 
and nature of scientific knowledge” 
(Bloor 1976: 3). In this context, how-
ever, knowledge, or the content of sci-
entific knowledge, were conceived of 
primarily in terms of cognitive beliefs; 
this becomes clear when, for instance, 
Bloor’s famous “symmetry principle” 
claims to explain “true and false be-
liefs” by the same type of causes (ibid.: 
7). The same applies for systems theory 
which de facto reduces knowledge to 
communication and the employment 
of distinctions of “true vs. untrue” 
(which obviously are qualifications of 
beliefs or propositions) in the medium 
of meaning (Sinn), while (material) re-
search practices do not matter in 
Luhmann’s sociology of science. In this 
manner, constructivist sociologies of 
science implicitly and inadvertently 
share the same cognitivist reduction of 
scientific knowledge to theories, sys-
tems of belief and true-or-false-
distinctions as did their “counterpart”, 
representative realism (cf. Rouse 
2002a: 136). The main reasons for this 
specific framing of SSK’s object of 
study are to be found in the history of 
the field, especially in the strong pro-
gramme’s explicit opposition to Mann-
heim’s and Merton’s approaches. As is 
well-known, both of them had ulti-
mately exempted the content of scien-
tific knowledge from sociological 
study, thus leaving its explanation to 
traditional rationalist accounts. To so-
ciologically challenge this exemption 
would seem to be facilitated, as Rouse 
argues, “if the contested turf were de-
scribed commensurably” (ibid.: 143).8 
                                                             
8 It is in this context where Rouse locates 
the most important and fruitful contribu-
tions by scholars of feminist science studies 
(as for instance Donna Haraway, Evelyn 
Fox Keller or Karen Barad) to overcoming 
the tacit continuities of constructivist soci-
ologies with traditional philosophical ac-
counts of science. In particular, “feminist 
science studies shift their primary object of 
study from the semantic content of knowl-
edge or belief to a concern with relation-
ships (...) between knowers and known” 
In contrast, a postconstructivist per-
spective gives rise to a completely dif-
ferent account of the “content” of sci-
ence: “Is the content of a science its 
verbal representation of the world, or 
the reconfiguration of the world itself 
through practical engagement with 
things, people, and prior patterns of 
talk? The more radical post-
constructivist claim is not that the con-
tent of a science can be explained by 
social rather than material or rational 
‘factors’, but that the only coherent no-
tions of content or meaning incorpo-
rate the social, material and discursive 
setting of a science.” (Rouse 2002b: 
73). 
Such a reflective, postconstructivist in-
terpretation of the content of scientific 
knowledge not only demarcates a cru-
cial difference to social constructivism 
in terms of theory but also has signifi-
cant consequences for the analysis of 
empirically relevant issues, as I will 
demonstrate later, referring to the ex-
ample of scientific non-knowledge. 
Apart from this, there is another im-
portant implication of Rouse’s claims 
that I can mention only briefly here. If 
the “content” of a science not only con-
sists of beliefs and theories but of the 
entire (i.e. also institutional) setting of 
scientific practices, then the opposition 
and presumed incompatibility of an 
“institutionalist” and a “sociology of 
knowledge paradigm” that has 
emerged within German-speaking sci-
ence studies in the mid-1990s (cf. 
Schimank 1995a, 1995b; Amann 1995) 
turns out to be based on questionable 
premises and appears to be misleading 
(cf. Böschen/Wehling 2004: 22-25). 
 
                                                                          
(Rouse 2002a: 146-147). Their interest in 
the materiality (and accountability) of 
these relationships led feminist scholars to 
oppose also the forms of relativism and 
“detachment” which seem to be constitu-
tive for SSK’s explanatory programme (cf. 
ibid.: 151-159). 
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3.2 The Situated Materiality of 
Scientific Practices 
Over the last years, “practice” has be-
come one of the most important but 
also most strongly contested concepts 
in contemporary social theory and so-
ciological research (cf. Schatzki et al. 
2001; Reckwitz 2003). Given the mul-
tiplicity of perspectives from which 
practices are studied and theoretically 
understood, “it is not surprising that 
there is no unified practice approach” 
(Schatzki 2001: 2). How, then, is the 
key concept of (scientific) practice or 
practices to be comprehended within a 
postconstructivist framework? First, it 
is important not to misunderstand sci-
entific practice (for instance in narrow 
terms of experimentation) as opposed 
to and strictly distinct from theory. 
Leaving out of account the widely ac-
knowledged “theory-ladenness” of ob-
servation and experimentation, one 
should better conceive of scientific 
theories “in terms of theoretical prac-
tices of modelling particular situations 
or domains; articulating, extending, 
and reconciling those models and their 
constituent concepts and techniques; 
and connecting theoretical models to 
experimental systems, rather than in 
the classical sense of theoria or 
through more recent analyses of theo-
ries as axiomatic or model-theoretic 
systems” (Rouse 2002a: 163 – first 
emphasis added). Against this back-
drop, it becomes clear that scientific 
practices may not be reduced and nar-
rowed to material practices but neces-
sarily encompass discursive dimen-
sions as well. This understanding of 
scientific practices as inherently dis-
cursive is opposed to both a represen-
tionalist account, according to which 
language simply expresses the given 
“objective” meanings of things, and a 
presumedly “materialist” underestima-
tion of the significance of scientific 
language, reducing it to “mere” rheto-
rics or literary technologies. As Rouse 
(1996a: 153) rightly remarks, 
“(s)ignification in scientific practice 
(including metaphors and models as 
well as supposedly ‘literal’ discourse) is 
too rich, inventive, and important to be 
adequately understood in these terms”. 
The eminent role of discursive prac-
tices in the sciences as well as their 
mutual interactions with (if not insepa-
rability from) material, experimental 
practices are highlighted in Lily Kay’s 
illuminating account of the history of 
the genetic code. “Encompassing ac-
tivities such as naming, describing, in-
terpreting, analogising, and signifying 
discursive practices have formed the 
conceptual framework guiding molecu-
lar biologists in their theorising, ex-
perimental design and interpretations 
(...).” (Kay 1999: 15). Discourses are 
therefore “a way of thinking and doing” 
(ibid.: 16). 
A second key element of the postcon-
structivist account of scientific prac-
tices is even more crucial, and pre-
sumably more unfamiliar and con-
tested within social theory: from the 
reflections on knowledge and the con-
tent of science portrayed in the previ-
ous section it follows that practices in 
this context may by no means be re-
duced to the doings of social actors 
(e.g. scientific researchers) “as distinct 
from the material setting of what they 
do” (Rouse 2002a: 163). Instead, an 
adequate conception of (scientific) 
practices has to encompass the mate-
rial “configuration of the world” 
(Rouse 1996a: 133) which makes the 
activities of individual or collective 
agents become significant, coherent 
and intelligible. In explicit contrast to 
widespread notions of practices as 
rules and regularities of social actors’ 
doings, Rouse stresses that “practices 
are not just patterns of action, but the 
meaningful configurations of the world 
within which actions can take place in-
telligibly, and thus practices incorpo-
rate the objects that they are enacted 
with and on and the settings in which 
they are enacted” (ibid.: 135).9 This 
claim is not to be interpreted in terms 
                                                             
9 In the wider context of the above-
mentioned workplace studies, a similar 
conception of situated practice has been 
outlined by Suchman (1987). 
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of an extended and radicalised “sym-
metry principle”, as suggested by La-
tour, but more in the sense of a “prior-
ity of the situation”, whereby “situa-
tion” is understood as “the relational 
complex of embodied agents in mean-
ingfully configured settings for possi-
ble action” (ibid.: 150). By contrast to 
Latour, Rouse is less concerned with 
ascribing symmetrical explanatory 
power to human and non-human “ac-
tants” than with explaining what ren-
ders the performances of human actors 
meaningful and intelligible. As he ar-
gues, “one cannot engage in skillful ac-
tivity without the right sort of equip-
ment in the right surroundings” (ibid.), 
whereby skills are not fixed once and 
forever but develop and change in in-
teraction with the material setting.  
One a more general level, this empha-
sis on the situated materiality of prac-
tices has far-reaching implications for 
epistemology as well as social theory 
which are diametrically opposed not 
only to realist and representationalist 
assumptions of independently given 
“natural” objects of cognition but also 
to Luhmann’s “autopoietic” model of 
operationally closed observing (social) 
systems.10 The profound differences 
between these conceptual approaches 
and postconstructivism are highlighted 
by the following statement: “If the 
post-constructivist tradition denies 
                                                             
10 Something that systems theory and post-
constructivism doubtlessly have in com-
mon is a shift away from representational-
ism. As defined by Barad (2003: 804), rep-
resentationalism is “the belief in the onto-
logical distinction between representations 
and that which they purport to represent; 
in particular, that which is represented is 
held to be independent of all practices of 
representing”. However, Luhmann, some-
what paradoxically, seeks to escape the pit-
falls of that belief by entirely cutting off any 
epistemologically significant relationship 
between an operationally closed observing 
system and its environment (cf. Luhmann 
1990, 1995). In a way, he thus even radical-
ises the representationalist background as-
sumption of a clear-cut distinction between 
the “knower” and the “world” (for critical 
discussion see Christis 2001; Wehling 
2002). 
that there is any role for ‘unrecon-
structed nature’ in our understanding 
of science, it is not because we are un-
able to get ‘outside’ of a relatively self-
enclosed social world, but because we 
have never been ‘inside’ one in the first 
place. The question is not how we ever 
get from our social world to a tran-
scendent nature, but how meaningful 
language and other practices are sus-
tained as part of the ongoing recon-
figuration of a reliable and meaningful 
environment.” (Rouse 2002b: 69)11 
The basic and fruitful idea behind this 
seemingly extravagant claim is not 
some kind of metaphysical monism but 
the rejection of understanding scien-
tific practices, both material and dis-
cursive, in terms of representation or 
mediation. Practices (or representa-
tions as their stabilised results) are 
themselves configurations in and of the 
world; they neither represent a given 
“natural world” supposed to exist “be-
hind” those configurations nor mediate 
it with a distinct “social world” (cf. 
Rouse 1996a: 150-151, 2002a: 173). 
Scientific understanding, according to 
Rouse (2002b: 69), is “not ‘inside’ 
minds or cultures, but embodied in 
worldly phenomena, skills, equipment, 
institutions, and situated discursive 
exchanges that cut across the tradi-
tional bounds of natural objects and 
social or cultural meanings”. This re-
flection leads to a third important fea-
ture of postconstructivism: an account 
of scientific practices in terms of their 
temporality and performativity. 
3.3 The Performativity of Scien-
tific Practices 
Perhaps even to a greater extent than 
practice, “performativity” has devel-
oped over the last years into a very 
prominent and widely used but equally 
ambiguous and contested concept, par-
ticularly in philosophy and cultural or 
                                                             
11 In such reflections one will find the rea-
sons why postconstructivism is considered 
to be a fruitful and promising conceptual 
approach in areas such as environmental 
history (see for instance Asdal 2003). 
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gender studies (cf. for an introduction 
Wirth 2002). If one tries to pick out 
one feature that (almost) all of the dif-
ferent references to performativity 
have in common, then the best candi-
date might be its non- or anti-
essentialist impetus: performativity is 
not concerned with substantial things 
but rather with the (temporal) effects 
of “doings” and “performances”, of re-
peated actions of some sort. It is this 
basic idea of performativity that has 
been attractive for that branch of sci-
ence studies which seeks to move be-
yond representionalism (Barad 2003: 
805):12 the objects studied by science 
are not independently given, stable 
“things” awaiting discovery but instead 
temporally emergent phenomena that 
are produced (or co-produced) in their 
specific forms by and within the scien-
tific practices themselves. According to 
Pickering, a performative account of 
science is one “in which the perform-
ances - the doings - of human and ma-
terial agency come to the fore. Scien-
tists are human agents in a field of ma-
terial agency which they struggle to 
capture in machines. Further, human 
and material agency are reciprocally 
intertwined in this struggle. Their con-
tours emerge in the temporality of 
practice and are definitional of and 
sustain one another.” (Pickering 1995: 
21)  
I would to like illustrate the fundamen-
tal differences between a “traditional”, 
representionalist approach to science 
(the basic assumptions of which are at 
least partly shared by social construc-
tivism) on the one hand, and a perfor-
mative (and “postconstructivist“) ac-
count on the other, by referring to 
Pickering’s critical discussion of the 
                                                             
12 While the concept of performativity as 
yet has only sparsely been used in an ex-
plicit manner in science studies (cf. 
Pickering 1995; Barad 2003; Kroß 2003), 
there is nevertheless a wider range of 
scholars propounding performative under-
standings of science without making ex-
press reference to the concept. Barad 
(2003: 807) names among the latter Hara-
way, Latour and Rouse. 
concept of “constraints”. Usually, con-
straints are conceived as some kind of 
external (social, institutional, techni-
cal, natural, etc.) condition that objec-
tively limits scientific activities as well 
as pushing them in certain directions.13 
Pickering criticises this widespread no-
tion of constraint for drawing too static 
a picture of the relationships between 
scientific practices and their objects, 
and also their cultural and institutional 
contexts and surroundings. Con-
straints, as he argues, are traditionally 
understood as “temporally nonemer-
gent”, thus “preexisting practice and 
enduring through it”: they “are always 
there” (ibid.: 65-66). In contrast, 
Pickering proposes introducing the 
concept of “resistances” in order to 
adequately take into account the tem-
porality of the relationships between 
science and its various contexts. Con-
trary to constraints, resistances are 
“genuinely emergent in time, as a block 
arising in practice to this or that pas-
sage of goal-oriented practice” (ibid. 
1995: 66). Against this background, 
scientific practice consists of a perfor-
mative intertwining of emergent resis-
tances on the one hand and repeated 
efforts to overcome them on the other. 
Pickering speaks of “a dialectic of resis-
tance and accommodation, where re-
sistance denotes the failure to achieve 
an intended capture of agency in prac-
tice, and accommodation an active 
human strategy of response to resis-
tance, which can include revisions to 
goals and intentions as well as to the 
material form of the machine in ques-
tion and to the human frame of ges-
tures and social relations that sur-
round it” (ibid.: 22).14 Under happy 
circumstances, this dialectic may result 
                                                             
13 However, I do not agree with Pickering’s 
(1995: 65) statement that constraints are 
usually restricted to the distinctively hu-
man realm. Frequently, also technical or 
natural conditions of scientific activities are 
conceived as objectively given “con-
straints”. 
14 One should note that Pickering here does 
not employ any idea of a “symmetry” be-
tween human and non-human actants, or 
between human and material agency. 
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in “interactive stabilisations of ma-
chinic performances and conceptual 
strata” (ibid.: 182), whereby the latter 
include an “interpretive account” of 
how the involved apparatuses of obser-
vation and measurement work, as well 
as a “phenomenal account” of the as-
pects of the material world under con-
sideration (cf. ibid.: 68-96). In cases of 
successful stabilisation and alignment 
of these three elements, one could 
speak of the generation of new, objec-
tive knowledge, with the passage 
trough the “mangle of practice” 
(Pickering) defining “a rather severe 
criterion of objectivity” (ibid.: 195). In 
order to avoid realist or representa-
tionalist misinterpretations: this 
knowledge does by no means “reveal” 
what and how an independently given 
object “really is” but is a local and tem-
poral achievement due to the “consti-
tutive intertwining (...) between mate-
rial and human agency” (ibid.: 15). The 
stability and validity of this knowledge 
therefore depends on the maintenance 
and repeatability of those practices (in 
Rouse’s broad sense) that had both co-
produced the respective “machinic per-
formances” and allowed them to be 
connected to cognitive expectations 
and theoretical reflections. 
It is important not to misunderstand 
this performative account of scientific 
knowledge and practice as if phenom-
ena or resistances which are tempo-
rally emergent from and within prac-
tices were less “real” or “material” than 
stable things that are “always there” 
(see for instance van den Belt 2003: 
209). Instead, the concept of perfor-
mativity results in a different under-
standing of what Barad (2003: 815) 
has termed the “primary epistemologi-
cal unit”. This “unit” is no longer to be 
found in independent objects with 
supposedly inherent properties but 
rather in phenomena which indicate, 
as Barad argues following the physicist 
Niels Bohr, the “inseparability of ‘ob-
served object’ and ‘agencies of observa-
tion’” (ibid.: 814). Thus, while doubt-
less being a relational term, “phe-
nomenon” signifies “relations without 
preexisting relata” (ibid.: 815). The 
“observed objects” neither are accessi-
ble “outside” of their constitutive rela-
tions to agencies of observation, nor do 
they exist “behind” or “beyond” these 
relations. This by no means denies the 
materiality or reality of the phenom-
ena, insofar as, according to Bohr, 
phenomena necessarily involve 
“things” which ultimately admit of the 
observation but may not be reified as 
existing independently of the (mate-
rial) practices of observation (cf. Barad 
1996: 176). What is observed is, in 
other words, “not a property of the ob-
ject in isolation but of the phenomenon 
as a whole” (Rouse 2004: 148). Or, as 
Barad has put it: “Reality is not com-
posed of things-in-themselves or 
things-behind-phenomena, but 
‘things’-in-phenomena.” (Barad 2003: 
817) One should add “that material re-
sistances are only manifest relative to 
prior expectations; they have no exis-
tence in the absence of such expecta-
tions” (Pickering 1989: 281).15 Tempo-
rally emergent resistances or phenom-
ena are recognisable only when they 
can be captured and connected, within 
material-discursive practices, to the 
cognitive expectations of an individual 
scientist or a scientific community. 
This points to the question of how the 
issue of scientific non-knowledge 
might be comprehended within a post-
constructivist framework. As I shall ar-
gue in the next section, postconstruc-
tivism offers new ways of adequately 
understanding this important and con-
tested issue, in particular its most diffi-
cult aspect: unknown or unrecognised 
non-knowledge. 
 
                                                             
15 This claim might appear to be mislead-
ing; yet, again, it does not deny the materi-
ality of the setting from which resistances 
might emerge. But in the absence of cogni-
tive expectations, resistances do not be-
come manifest, they have no manifest exis-
tence.  
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4 The Embeddedness of Sci-
entific Non-Knowledge – A 
Postconstructivist Account 
For about 15 or 20 years, the novel and 
unfamiliar issue of scientific ignorance 
or non-knowledge has increasingly 
gained attention, both in the (social) 
sciences and in the general public (cf. 
for instance Wynne 1992; Luhmann 
1992; Wehling 2001). Moreover, the 
focus has shifted to what Jerry Ravetz 
(1990) has termed “science-based ig-
norance”, that is non-knowledge gen-
erated by science itself. The media re-
searcher Holly Stocking had therefore 
suggested a few years ago the project of 
a “sociology of scientific ignorance 
(SSI) to complement and expand the 
existing sociology of scientific knowl-
edge (SSK)” (Stocking 1998: 173; cf. 
also Wehling 2004). In this section, I 
would like to substantiate my thesis 
that a postconstructivist conceptual 
approach is most appropriate to grasp 
the full range of the processes of gen-
erating scientific non-knowledge and 
especially to adequately understand 
the key phenomenon of “unrecognised 
non-knowledge” or, as it usually is 
termed by British and American schol-
ars, of “unknown unknowns” (cf. Ker-
win 1993; Grove-White 2001; Wynne 
2002). By this notion, situations are 
characterised in which the sciences 
don’t even know what they don’t know 
(cf. Wehling 2004: 71-72). The almost 
“classic” example of this state of com-
plete unawareness is the depletion of 
the ozone layer by CFCs which, even 
more than 40 years after mass produc-
tion of those substances was started 
around 1930, remained entirely be-
yond the scope of scientific expecta-
tions and cognitions (cf. Böschen 
2000: 41-104). In recent social con-
flicts over new technologies, for in-
stance over genetically modified organ-
isms (GMOs), questions of the possi-
bility, probability, or even unavoidabil-
ity of unknown unknowns are highly 
contested and increasingly coming to 
the fore (cf. Grove-White 2001; Wynne 
2002).16 
Can this strange, double negative no-
tion of unknown non-knowledge or 
unknown unknowns be sociologically 
(or philosophically) understood in a 
meaningful and consistent way at all? 
For, contrary to what Robert Merton 
(1987) has coined “specified igno-
rance”, unrecognised non-knowledge is 
by definition not present and observ-
able in the form of a certain individ-
ual’s or group’s explicit recognition of 
what they don’t know. But how to ex-
plore what is completely absent or, at 
least, appears to be completely absent 
(cf. Weinstein/Weinstein 1978)? At 
this point, the postconstructivist, non-
reifying and non-representationalist 
account of knowledge outlined above 
proves to be fruitful with regard to the 
following three closely related aspects: 
First, if Rouse’s claim is right that 
knowledge is “embedded” in situated 
research practices and not “fully ab-
stractable in representational theories” 
(Rouse 1987: 24), then the same ap-
plies for non-knowledge. If, secondly, 
it holds true that knowledge is only 
poorly understood as the “possession” 
of certain knowers, for instance a 
group of scientists, then non-
knowledge may not simply be reduced 
to the mere “absence” or “lack”, indi-
vidual or collective, of such a posses-
sion. Thirdly, identifying the “content” 
of scientific knowledge not simply with 
its verbal (or mathematical) represen-
tation of the world but instead with the 
“reconfiguration of the world itself 
through practical engagement with 
things, people, and prior patterns of 
talk” (Rouse 2002b: 73) gives rise to a 
                                                             
16 In order to avoid misunderstandings, one 
should emphasise that talking and debating 
about the possibility of unknown unknowns 
does not necessarily mean that one be-
comes aware of what is not known (or of 
what eventually might happen when GMOs 
are released to the environment). The cru-
cial point in social conflicts is that, by defi-
nition, the occurrence of unknown un-
knowns can neither be proved nor refuted 
in advance. 
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more comprehensive understanding of 
scientific non-knowledge: no less than 
knowledge, non-knowledge is embed-
ded and inscribed in practices con-
ceived as material reconfigurations of 
the world. Thus, the (more or less) ex-
plicit recognition and scientific “speci-
fication” of what is not known in terms 
of theories or hypotheses is only one 
dimension of the problem which cer-
tainly is important but at the same 
time extremely dependent on highly 
contingent and precarious precondi-
tions. To put it differently: unknown 
unknowns, or unrecognised non-
knowledge, are inherent in the situated 
materiality of scientific practices; they 
are elements and (possible) effects of 
the material settings which neverthe-
less are not manifest (or do not exist, 
as Pickering has argued) in the form of 
temporally emergent “resistances” or 
interactively stabilised “phenomena”.17 
For unknown unknowns to become 
manifest, above all appropriate mate-
rial and discursive practices are re-
quired, including the formation of ade-
quate cognitive expectations as well as 
technical equipment of observation 
and measurement. There is, however, 
no guarantee of the successful align-
ment and interactive stabilisation of 
“on the one side, captures and fram-
ings of material agency, and, on the 
                                                             
17 Alexander Bogner’s criticism misses this 
point by confusing the postconstructivist 
emphasis on the embeddedness of (non-) 
knowledge in material configurations with 
a realist and representationalist notion of 
reference. In a postconstructivist view, (un-
recognised) non-knowledge does not refer 
to “more or less objectively knowable phe-
nomena”, as Bogner (2005: 23) suggests, 
but is embedded in and incorporates a set-
ting of material entities, agencies of obser-
vation, established spatial or temporal “ho-
rizons” of attention, and so on. Within this 
setting it is of course a crucial question 
whether (and when) at least some of its 
elements can be “captured” and connected 
to cognitive expectations by situated prac-
tices, both experimental and discursive. 
But this is by no means a retreat to repre-
sentational realism. By contrast, Bogner 
again traps the sociological analysis of non-
knowledge in the ritualised dichotomy of 
realism and constructivism. 
other, regularized, routinized, stan-
dardized, disciplined human practices” 
(Pickering 1995: 102). On the contrary, 
one can by no means rely on the as-
sumption that the various elements of 
the configurations in which scientific 
or technological practices are enacted 
will, sooner or later, “manifest them-
selves” due to their “sheer” materiality 
and therefore be fully transparent and 
controllable.  
The importance of such a non-reifying, 
postconstructivist account of non-
knowledge which is not centred on 
knowing (or not knowing) minds and 
subjects immediately comes to the fore 
if one understands the technical im-
plementation of scientific knowledge 
primarily in terms of an “extension of 
scientific practices beyond the research 
setting” (Rouse 1996a: 131). What is 
crucial in this regard is “the recon-
struction of the surrounding world to 
resemble the laboratory in important 
respects. Objects and substances cre-
ated in and for the laboratory are in-
troduced into other settings. Partitions 
and enclosures are built to prevent 
unwanted or unaccountable mixtures. 
Actions and events are more carefully 
sequenced and timed. Instruments to 
register and interpret the signs first 
elicited from objects in laboratories 
become standard equipment else-
where.” (Ibid.). The issue of non-
knowledge, in particular of unknown 
unknowns, becomes relevant here in 
two respects: first, the strategies of 
partitions and enclosures to prevent 
“unaccountable mixtures” will always 
tend to be limited and incomplete; the 
complex social or natural world can 
not really be made into the controllable 
“micro-world” of the laboratory. The 
metaphor of “society as a laboratory” 
(Krohn/Weyer 1989) therefore re-
mains a metaphor, if, of course, an il-
luminating one; unforeseen and/or un-
recognised effects can certainly not be 
entirely prevented. Second, if one takes 
into account that scientific practices 
even within the laboratory are not al-
ways fully transparent and recognis-
able (cf. Collins 2001), then unknown 
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non-knowledge embedded in the re-
search setting will inadvertently be 
“exported” into the surrounding natu-
ral and/or social worlds with possibly 
unforeseeable consequences. Given 
this background, it comes as no sur-
prise that the hitherto uncontested au-
thority of science over the definition of 
ignorance and non-knowledge is in-
creasingly challenged by social actors, 
resulting in a remarkable and far-
reaching “politicization of ignorance” 
(Stocking/Holstein 1993) which in-
cludes above all the questioning of the 
dominant framings of scientific non-
knowledge (see for instance Grove-
White 2001). An attempt, as made for 
instance by van den Daele (1996), to 
restrict the “relevant non-knowledge” 
to the known unknowns, that means to 
the “specified ignorance” of the experts 
in the respective fields, is therefore not 
only dubious in terms of risk regula-
tion and public policy (cf. Wehling 
2003: 129-131). In addition, it sticks to 
exactly that narrow, representational-
ist conception of knowledge (and non-
knowledge) in terms of a “possession” 
of a certain scientific community that 
postconstructivism seeks to overcome. 
What follows from a postconstructivist 
account of scientific (non-)knowledge, 
is, in contrast, the demand to extend 
the accountability of the sciences be-
yond what is explicitly known or not 
known, thus encompassing the mate-
rial configurations in which scientific 
practices are enacted. 
With respect to this demand, different 
scientific “cultures of non-knowledge”, 
understood as practices of generating, 
recognising, defining and communicat-
ing non-knowledge, move to the fore.18 
As Karin Knorr-Cetina (1999) has 
shown convincingly in her study on the 
“epistemic cultures” of high-energy 
                                                             
18 The exploration of such “cultures of non-
knowledge” (Nichtwissenskulturen) is the 
aim of a research project conducted at the 
Environmental Science Center of the Uni-
versity of Augsburg, using the examples of 
agrobiotechnology and mobile phone 
communication (cf. Böschen et al. 2005). 
physics and molecular biology, the sci-
ences differ widely in their ways of 
“making knowledge”. Drawing on 
Knorr-Cetina’s findings one can sup-
pose that these epistemic cultures do 
not only encompass “cultures of 
knowledge” but also, at the same time, 
cultures of non-knowledge, i.e. specific 
practices and routines of dealing with 
what is not known. Whereas, according 
to Knorr-Cetina (ibid.), high-energy 
physics inclines to actively search for 
“liminal” or “negative” knowledge, that 
means knowledge of the limits of its 
knowledge, molecular biology employs 
an epistemic strategy of “half-blind 
variation”: if experiments fail or show 
unexpected and unexplainable results, 
the scientists usually do not have much 
interest in carefully exploring the rea-
sons why but vary some of the ele-
ments of the experimental setting until 
it works and delivers explainable and 
usable results. The study of such rou-
tines, mainly tacit, of dealing with 
(self-generated) non-knowledge might 
offer fruitful perspectives for initiating 
more self-reflective research practices, 
especially when such contrasting scien-
tific cultures of non-knowledge are 
confronted with each other in public 
arenas, as in the controversy over 
GMOs. 
5 Conclusion: Beyond Real-
ism and Constructivism? 
In his discussion of how to deal with 
material objects and experimental 
practices in science studies, Henk van 
den Belt maintains that postconstruc-
tivism as outlined by Rouse, in spite of 
its “deceptive label”, is “really just an-
other version of radical constructiv-
ism” (van den Belt 2003: 216), which, 
according to him, “makes the existence 
of an object depend on human knowl-
edge” (ibid.: 209).19 Other critics might 
                                                             
19 Van den Belt aims to defend a “moderate 
constructivism”, as advocated in particular 
by the “strong programme”, against this 
“radical constructivism” to which he attrib-
utes, besides Rouse, the work of Ashmore, 
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consider postconstructivism as nothing 
but a retreat from “strict constructiv-
ism” (Bogner 2005) to an at best 
slightly more sophisticated version of 
traditional realism. Can the postcon-
structivist claim to move beyond the 
unfruitful dichotomy of the “undead” 
realism and constructivism neverthe-
less be substantiated and justified – or 
is there no escape from the pitiless rule 
of being either realist or constructivist 
(and from being misinterpreted from 
both sides)? 
Usually it is taken for granted in the 
ongoing discussions on these issues 
that there are indeed fundamental dif-
ferences between realism and con-
structivism that render the two oppo-
nents more or less incompatible. With-
out denying such differences, one 
should not fail to see that there are 
also, more often implicit than explicit, 
striking continuities and correspon-
dences, beginning with a reifying no-
tion of knowledge which is tied to the 
semantic and representational “con-
tent” of scientific knowledge in the 
form of theories, propositions, mathe-
matical calculations, and so on (see 
above, Section 2.1.). It is at this point 
that postconstructivism intervenes: it 
does not seek to “overcome” the real-
ism-constructivism divide by succes-
sively weakening and playing down the 
differences between them until they 
meet somewhere “in the middle” (in 
the shape of “moderate” versions). On 
the contrary, the critical strategy of 
postconstructivism aims at transform-
ing (or at least irritating) the dichot-
omy itself by questioning the hidden 
background assumptions on which it is 
founded.  
                                                                          
Callon/Latour, Knorr-Cetina, Pickering and 
Woolgar (van den Belt 2003: 203). Yet, as I 
have demonstrated in Section 2, the basic 
assumption of postconstructivism is almost 
directly opposed to van den Belt’s asser-
tion: according to postconstructivism, 
knowledge is embedded in research prac-
tices and “depends” therefore on material 
configurations of the world. 
Representationalism is, according to 
Barad (2003: 812), “a prisoner of the 
problematic metaphysics it postulates”. 
This metaphysics “separates the world 
into the ontologically disjoint domains 
of words and things, leaving itself with 
the dilemma of their linkage such that 
knowledge is possible” (ibid.: 811). 
From a non-representationalist per-
spective, however, one becomes aware 
that the question of whether scientific 
knowledge is to be explained by natu-
ral or cognitive rather than social fac-
tors (or vice versa), of whether it re-
veals the “objective truth” of independ-
ent things or is “nothing but” a more or 
less arbitrary social construction, only 
arises if we understand knowledge as a 
“coherent domain of determinable 
facts susceptible to and in need of ex-
planation” (Rouse 2002a: 136). If, in 
contrast, scientific knowledge is con-
ceived as embedded in research prac-
tices, in material configurations that 
cut across the boundaries between the 
supposedly distinct “natural” and “so-
cial” realms, it becomes meaningless to 
ask whether those practices either are 
determined by the reality of natural 
objects or constructed by social actors 
and influences. The three postcon-
structivist key concepts outlined above, 
namely the deflationary account of 
knowledge, the notion of the situated 
materiality and discursivity of scien-
tific practices, and the concept of per-
formativity, therefore challenge and 
transform the shared background as-
sumptions of realism and constructiv-
ism - and thus elude and abrogate the 
dichotomy itself.20 Moreover, com-
pared to realism and social construc-
tivism, these concepts are able to con-
tribute to a more adequate and empiri-
cally rich image of the sciences and 
their achievements and successes as 
well as their risks and “blind spots” (cf. 
Section 3). 
                                                             
20 Apparently, this does not prevent these 
concepts from being misinterpreted either 
as traditional realism or radicalised con-
structivism. 
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Yet one should not underestimate the 
persistent influence and attraction of 
realism and constructivism as suppos-
edly coherent world views. It is in this 
sense that Rouse has ironically termed 
them “vampires” or “philosophical un-
dead” which, in spite of all critical ob-
jections that have been raised, “still 
haunt our concepts and interpretations 
of nature, culture, and science” and 
“continue to function even when the 
explicit positions and arguments have 
become otiose” (Rouse 2002b: 63). 
Against this background, postconstruc-
tivism may not be misunderstood as 
itself being or claiming to be a coher-
ent philosophical or even metaphysical 
account “above” or “outside” of the 
practices of generating, justifying or 
contesting knowledge. As I would like 
to suggest, it should instead be con-
ceived as a self-reflective and critical 
discursive strategy that aims to con-
tinuously question and undermine rei-
fying, one-sided interpretations of sci-
entific knowledge (cf. Asdal 2005: 
259). As a consequence, realism and 
social constructivism might lose their 
position of meta-theoretical certainties 
and guarantees: scientific knowledge 
can no longer be explained and legiti-
mised (or de-legitimised) with refer-
ence to either “nature” or “society”. 
What remains is “merely” the socially 
situated study of the scientific practices 
themselves and their reliability and ac-
countability, for instance in terms of 
relationships between “knowers” and 
the “known”, risks and benefits, or 
known and unknown unknowns. 
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